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Sustainable Markets and the State: Taxation,  
Cap-and-Trade, Pay-for-Success, and Nudging 
Lisa Knoll ∗ 
Abstract: »Nachhaltige Märkte und Staat: Besteuerung, “cap-and-trade”, “pay-
for-success” und Nudging«. Sustainable markets are heterogeneous phenome-
na, developed and implemented to keep up the idea of free economic choice 
against socialist and interventionist forms of environmental or social politics. 
This article is a plea to understand sustainable markets from the perspective of 
the state. It presents the history of welfare economics as an ongoing conflict 
about the question of how to solve the state-versus-market divide. It analyses 
and compares the welfare tax, the cap-and-trade mechanism, pay-for-success 
schemes like Social Impact Bonds, and nudging in order to demonstrate their 
dependence on certain historical state formations, and it links them back to 
welfare economic struggles between Pigou, Dales, Coase, and Thaler. In doing 
so it argues for the necessity to bring about the political morality of the micro-
economic technicalities of commensuration / commodification. These techni-
calities organize roles and positions for economic actors and state authorities 
in very different ways. By applying the analytical concept of the conventions of 
the state, this article develops a framework to understand the diversity of sus-
tainable state/market co-constructions. 
Keywords: Welfare economics, convention theory, neoliberalism, impact in-
vesting, carbon markets, commensuration, commodification. 
1.   Introduction 
In recent years, sustainable markets attracted interest from the social and eco-
nomic sciences and they have been analyzed with quite diverse terminologies, 
from “civilizing markets” (Callon 2009) and “concerned markets” (Geiger et 
al. 2014) to “caring capitalism” (Barman 2016). Sometimes, the phenomena are 
understood as “quasi-markets” (Le Grand 2011) in order to denote that we do 
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not necessarily see “markets,” but state guaranteed imitations of markets. The 
phenomena subsumed under the notion of sustainable markets are quite di-
verse. What they have in common is their attempt to solve welfare and/or envi-
ronmental problems by private means. Most of them apply abstract notions of 
“the market” (connected to incentives, efficiency, entrepreneurialism, innova-
tion, and/or flexibility) that are set against abstract notions of “the state” (con-
nected to inflexibility, inefficiency, and/or wastefulness). Sustainable markets 
originate in a world view, which requires states to implement and to guarantee 
markets, and they are thus driven by a paradox: they require state administra-
tions to avoid state intervention. The emergence of this “neoliberal” world view 
is as diverse (Mirowski and Plehwe 2009; Foucault 2010; Davies 2014) as the 
emergence of sustainable markets. As William Davies points out, 
neoliberalism comes to appear far less homogenous and all-consuming than its 
critiques might fear. Different political and sovereign objects require different 
conventions of evaluation in order to be rendered measurable and economical-
ly calculable. (Davies 2014, 27)  
This article analyzes the plurality of sovereign objects enshrined in the micro-
economic calculative devices of sustainable markets. It shows how diverse the 
welfare tax, the cap-and-trade mechanism, pay-for-success schemes, and nudging 
craft the state-versus-market distinction, and how diversely they conceive of 
the economic actor. To do so, it develops the analytical notion of the conven-
tions of the state. By combining the notion of state conventions introduced by 
Michael Storper and Robert Salais (1997, 207-23) with the work of Alain 
Desrosières (2003, 2011) on the conjunction of statistics, states, and markets, 
this article develops an analytical perspective that brings about the co-
constructions of states and markets via microeconomic technicalities. As 
Michel Foucault put it, “the state does not have an essence. [...] The state is 
nothing else but the mobile effect of a regime of multiple gouvernmentalities” 
(Foucault 2010, 77). This means that the state changes its appearance, its struc-
ture, its payment flows, and its sovereign objects during the establishment of 
commensuration and commodification processes (Espeland and Stevens 1998). 
At the heart of any sustainable market mechanism lays a statistical commensu-
ration process that is not neutral. The statistical mechanisms of sustainable 
markets do not only define the role of the economic actors and the regulated 
object, but also the role and the responsibility of the state, and monetary flows 
between the state and market actors. The article argues that this plurality in 
commensuration can be explained by the differences between a Keynesian 
interventionist state, multinational ordo-liberalism, the public-private entrepre-
neurial state, and the psychological state (Jones, Pykett and Whitehead 2013; 
Pykett, Jones and Whitehead 2016). Each of these conventional state forms 
allows a certain welfare economic attempt to become historical and legitimate. 
The welfare economic struggle over the question of how to solve the state 
versus market problem needs to be linked back to historical state constellations 
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that make a certain state-market distinction more plausible than others. Analyzing 
sustainable markets from the perspective of the state helps to see the immense 
form-investments (Thévenot 1984) prior to the end-of-the-pipe situations of 
evaluation, incentive economics, choice, and consumption often focused in the 
realm of market studies. This change in perspective is important to see the 
power relations and the redistributive relations instituted by welfare markets.  
The quite diverse market-building attempts analyzed in this article have their 
conceptual origins in the history of welfare economics, and their “in vivo”-forms 
(Callon 2009, 536) can be traced back to certain historical constellations (e.g., 
the cap-and-trade mechanism at the start of the global climate change negotia-
tions in the 1990s, and pay for-success in the era of New Public Management 
and the politics of austerity). Thus, the performativity of economics-argument 
(Callon 1998) is combined with a state conventional argument (Storper and 
Salais 1997) highlighting the importance of state formations for the emergence 
of certain sustainable market-paradigms. Today, we find the Pigovian welfare 
tax, cap-and-trade mechanism, pay-for-success schemes, and nudging concur-
rently implemented, and they can be combined and compromised at the regional, 
national, or international level in manifold ways. They need to be understood as 
contemporary conventional forms featuring specific historical trajectories.  
To show this, the article first outlines the history of welfare economics (Sec-
tion 2). The history of welfare economics can be read as a history of a constant 
struggle over questions of how to improve and rectify the just market para-
digm. Welfare economics is anxious about not giving the state power over free 
economic agents, but it is a conflicted subject how this can be achieved. This 
struggle unfolds as a complicated two-sided maneuver to repair the market 
without giving up the notion of the free market. The second section develops 
the analytical perspective of the conventions of the state (Section 3). This ana-
lytical framework allows grasping the diversity of economic statistical com-
mensuration techniques at the core of the sustainable market mechanism and 
linking it back to state formations. The third section analyzes and compares the 
welfare tax, the cap-and-trade-mechanism, pay-for-success schemes, and nudg-
ing as state/market configurations (Section 4). It is shown that during centuries-
old disputes over questions of how to solve the state versus market-problem, 
sustainable markets and the notion of the individual were transformed pro-
foundly. Nonetheless, today, we can observe a renewal of the welfare tax, and 
we see multiple combinations and compromises between the different sustaina-
ble market attempts analyzed in this article. The proposed framework aims at 
strengthening comparative research on contemporary sustainable markets and 
the multiple ways they design the state-versus-market divide via technologies 
of commensuration.  
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2. The State-versus-Market Divide in Welfare Economics 
This chapter is about the welfare economic struggle between Arthur C. Pigou, 
Ronald Coase, John H. Dales, and Richard H. Thaler on the question of how to 
solve the welfare problem by means of markets. These economists represent 
corner points in a more than a century-old microeconomic debate about how to 
solve welfare problems and how to define the capacities of states and individuals.  
Pigou (1912) is one of the first microeconomists conceptualizing sustainable 
markets (besides the notion of sustainability was not used at his time).1 Pigou 
developed his welfare economics in the era of John M. Keynes when state 
interventions were legitimate economic measures. Still, his welfare tax was not 
meant to serve redistributive or macroeconomic purposes, but as an economic 
activity steering instrument. Pigou (1920) defined inefficient market outcomes 
on the basis of a general equilibrium model. Negative externalities, or as Pigou 
labeled them “incidental uncharged disservices,” need to be corrected by sound 
market design. The Pigovian tax rate represents a Pareto-optimal point of inter-
section of marginal costs and marginal utility. Polluting factories are consid-
ered to adopt their production/output level to the point of their marginal bene-
fit, internalizing the costs of the societal damage through the corrected price 
mechanism. The price mechanism can be corrected via taxation or via subsidy. 
The Pigovian tax, in other words, is “a tax (subsidy) per unit on the externality-
generating activity equal to its marginal external damage (benefit)” (Baumol 
and Oates 1988, 55). Pigou (1928) endorsed the idea to reuse the fiscal income 
generated by his tax to create “positive externalities” through subsidization. 
This idea informed the “double-dividend hypothesis” (Pearce 1991; Jorgenson 
et al. 2013), which argues for earmarked reuse of the tax income to ease the 
burden for those being taxed, e.g., by green technology investment funds, or 
energy efficiency consultancy. Interestingly, this notion of the double use of 
the tax created a vital economic debate about the market distorting effects these 
interventions can have (Jiang 2001, 624). Another problem of the Pigovian tax 
is the information problem. Pigou admitted in a famous citation:  
It must be confessed, however, that we seldom know enough to decide in what 
fields and to what extent the State, on account of (the gaps between private 
                                                             
1  Sustainability is a versatile term with a younger career (Holden 2010). It entered the eco-
nomic sciences after the Club of Rome introduced the ecological use of the term for eco-
nomic thinking. It became a manifest multinational statement in the Brundtland Report, 
and developed into an economic accounting framework of triple bottom line, stating the 
equal importance of social, environmental, and financial goals. It later turned into forms of 
the so called “blended value proposition” (Emerson 2003), and impact investing (Barman 
2015), where social and environmental goals are transformed into schemes of financial val-
uation (Chiapello 2015). 
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and public costs) could interfere with individual choice. (Pigou 1954, 6 cited 
by Hayek 1960, 333) 
The welfare economic debate thus started problematizing the state as the locus 
of knowledge. The Pigovian tax, as Harold Demsetz (1996, 567) points out, is a 
“tax policy of an all-knowing, well-motivated state” informed by “the black-
board plans of economists,” which was an anathema to many economists of his 
time. Demsetz argues that Ronald Coase’s transaction cost theory needs to be 
understood as a reaction to the Pigovian tax. He states:  
The profession simply did not, and, I think, does not yet regard Coase’s posi-
tive transaction cost model as a serious attack on the state’s involvement in the 
resolution of externality problems. (ibid., 576)  
For Coase, determining a just price was something that should be possible 
within the market itself. Ronald Coase (1960) argues that the problem of social 
cost may be read as a problem of reciprocity where the harmed person(s) and 
the one(s) responsible for the social cost (e.g., an industrial site emitting harm-
ful gases to the environment) have the same interest in negotiating a solu-
tion/price to the problem. Those being harmed have an interest in not being 
polluted, and the polluter has an interest in keeping up his pollution in order to 
produce a good required by society. Both might negotiate a just price for com-
pensation. Coase put it this way: 
The question is commonly thought of as one in which A inflicts harm on B 
and what has to be decided is: how should we restrain A? But this is wrong. 
We are dealing with a problem of a reciprocal nature. To avoid the harm to B 
would inflict harm on A. The real question that has to be decided is: should A 
be allowed to harm B or should B be allowed to harm A? (Coase 1960, 2) 
In so doing, Coase’s theory provides an “anthropological world-view” that 
“presumes that human beings are all possessed of the capacity to negotiate 
agreements” (Davies 2014, 54). From this line of thinking the “law and eco-
nomics”-school emerged (Posner 1973). Here, an efficient price for compensa-
tion can be negotiated and fixed on a contractual basis. In case the bilateral 
negotiation fails due to transaction costs, the price may be identified via an 
economically trained jurisdiction. Furthermore, Coase argued that markets, in 
general, are not more efficient than firms (Coase 1937), which renders the 
question of market efficiency an empirical/ analytical problem. This, for exam-
ple, had consequences for competition and cartel policy. Market efficiency can 
now be defined as an empirical problem of consumer welfare (Marty 2015). 
Via this conceptual turn, market dominance can now indicate efficiency and 
not necessarily, as it used to be, a proof for the unjust market power of a mo-
nopoly (Davies 2017). A-priori defined state interventions, even those imple-
mented to guarantee markets, were delegitimized by the Chicago law and eco-
nomics tradition. Thus, the economic line of thinking Coase founded is not 
about guaranteeing ‘markets’ (in the sense of a demand and supply-
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mechanism), but rather economic activity, private initiative, entrepreneurship, 
and corporations.  
In a different way, the economist John H. Dales (1968) thought about a solu-
tion to solve the problem of welfare via the construction of pollution rights. 
Like Coase, Dales wanted to solve the information problem by the market. 
Dales developed an argumentation, in which subsidies, taxes, and regulations, 
all create problems of the same kind:  
In the end, the costs will be spread around, and the general population will pay 
for pollution control. This is why, when we are dealing with a large population 
and a large area […], it seems more realistic to deal with society as a whole, 
rather than with groups. (Dales 1968, 83)  
In this quote, the population is used as a justification for the necessity of an 
efficient price mechanism, which bears fewer costs on the society as a whole. It 
is astonishing how much Dales assumed the “administrative simplicity” (Dales 
1968, 97) of his idea, considering the pivotal role of “the Board” (Dales 1968, 
93) in markets for pollution rights. In the following quotation, Dales envisages 
a market for pollution rights:  
Let us try to set up a ‘market’ in ‘pollution rights.’ The board starts the pro-
cess by creating a certain number of Pollution Rights, each Right giving who-
ever buys it the right to discharge one equivalent ton of wastes into natural 
water during the current year. Suppose that the current level of pollution is 
roughly satisfactory. On this assumption, if half a million tons of wastes are 
currently being dumped into the water system, the Board would issue half a 
million Rights. All waste dischargers would then be required to buy whatever 
number of Rights they need; if a factory dumps 1000 tons of waste per year it 
will have to buy 1000 Rights. To put the market into operation, let us say that 
the Board decides to withhold 5 per cent of the Rights in order to allow for the 
growth of production and population during the first year, and therefore offers 
475,000 Rights for sale. Since demand is for 500,000, the Rights will immedi-
ately command some positive price – say, 10 cents each. (Dales 1968, 93) 
This system guarantees a just market not by defining the price (like with 
Pigou), but by limiting the overall volume of tradable emission rights. What is 
kept free from state regulation is “the inside of the market” (Knoll 2015). The 
choices over the emission reduction strategies, and the calculation of the costs 
for emission reductions, are left to the economic actors that can decide on 
whether to sell or buy emission quotas.  
A fourth type of welfare economics is the “liberal paternalism” of Richard 
H. Thaler and Cass Sunstein. By their book “Nudge: Improving decisions about 
health, wealth and happiness” the authors draw upon insights from behavioral 
economics (Kahneman, Slavic and Tversky 1982) and cognitive and experi-
mental psychology. In their view, the “homo sapiens” (Thaler and Sunstein 
2008, 7) makes predictable mistakes due to fallacies and biases. The free agent 
is not considered to be rational, but an emotional and moral character, which 
means that his or her environment needs to be changed so that people would 
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adopt a new behavioral pattern unconsciously. In order to increase the welfare 
of human beings, they need to be “nudged” into the right direction. In their 
words, a nudge is a “choice architecture that alters people’s behaviour in a 
predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their 
economic incentives” (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, 6).  
Nudging suggest that it is possible to reshape the environments within which 
people make decisions in a way that makes it easier for them to adopt finan-
cial, health and environmental behaviours that are in their own best interests. 
Nudge has become popular because it suggests that it may be possible to ad-
dress a range of social problems at minimal cost while also preserving peo-
ple’s personal freedoms. (Whitehead et al. 2014, 13)  
Thus, this welfare economic program is formulated against coercion and 
against economic steering effects adhering extra costs to economic agents. In 
the view of its inventors, this “liberal paternalism is not an oxymoron” (Sun-
stein and Thaler 2003), because it avoids coercion and extra costs for those 
being nudged. Nudging can take on a huge variety of forms, from design strat-
egies, like arranging healthy apples in cafeterias within easy reach (Thaler and 
Sunstein 2008, 11), or arranging opt-out situations at corporate pension fund 
schemes (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, 111) and organ donation (Thaler and Sun-
stein 2008, 176), rather than opt-in situations of choice, which many people 
just forget due to laziness or a lack of attention. In some way, nudging is simi-
lar to a tax. It requires an all-knowing, well-motivated state informed by wel-
fare economics. The difference is that rational choice has been replaced by 
irrational behavior, so that the “incentive structure” may comprise the whole 
set of the societal, organizational, emotional, and digital environment of an 
individual having a provable effect on behavioral patterns. By decoupling the 
welfare mechanism from price, a huge range of instruments comes into the 
range of welfare economics: from peer-to-peer education/pressure and social 
marketing and design strategies (Whitehead et al. 2014), to the design of more 
complex and collective social policy programs, like the mentioned pension 
fund interventions.  
What we have seen so far is that the blackboard plans of economists change 
over time. They are, in one way or the other, defending the state-versus-market 
divide, even though these defenses lead to constellations in which the very 
concept of the free market vanishes in order to keep up the notion of the free 
individual. What we can learn from this is that neither the structures and the 
design of markets, the free agent, nor the state are historically fixed. They 
change during the course of critique and justification (Boltanski and Thévenot 
2006) and they cannot be analyzed independently from each other. 
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3. States, Markets, and Statistics in Convention Theory 
In order to understand the diversity of the sustainable market phenomenon this 
article harnesses convention theory. Convention theory addresses the importance 
of analyzing markets from the perspective of collective configurations designed 
and justified to ensure the common good (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). 
Markets are thus analyzed from the perspective of the (public and private) 
bureaucracy built and altered to establish plural conventional forms of justice 
and justesse. Furthermore, convention theory identifies moral configurations 
within quantitative tools that guarantee market infrastructures. By outlining the 
history of economic methodologies and statistics these tools unfold their inner 
moralities and hierarchies. In the words of Ève Chiapello, conventionalists 
“consider that quantification systems have a history, and that it is possible to 
sketch out that history by identifying some major turning points in the 
conception of the phenomena” (Chiapello and Godefroy 2016, 156). The 
sustainable market phenomenon thus tackles two conventionalist strands of 
thinking: the notion of the convention of the state, and the historicity of the tools 
of commensuration enshrined within microeconomic methodology.2  
The notion of the convention of the state was introduced by Michael Storper 
and Robert Salais (1997, 207-23). This concept understands markets from the 
perspective of the state. Akin to Michel Foucault, for whom the “state is not a 
universal nor in itself autonomous power,” but “the mobile effect of a regime 
of multiple gouvernmentalities” (Foucault 2010, 77), the notion of the 
conventions of the state offers a perspective to bring about the plural 
governmentalities enshrined within market and/or economy constructions. For 
Storper and Salais (1997),  
[t]he state, like other institutions, is essentially a convention between persons, 
but unlike other institutions, all State conventions must define the way the 
‘common good’ is constructed for the society. (Storper and Salais 1997, 208)  
This means that the institutions of the state are shaped by built-in conventions 
defining the coordination modalities, the relationships and the hierarchies 
between legal and technical devices and economic agents in order to guarantee 
a just economy. Storper and Salais further state: 
[…] conventions […] shape what the State is actually able to do in pursuit of 
the common good. Conventions of the State are mobilized, like other 
conventions, in situations of economic action. [...] Such a reading allows us to 
go beyond the tired ‘states vs. markets’ paradigm to suggest that the 
considerable variety and diversity of frameworks of collective action should 
                                                             
2  For this conventionalist tradition of identifying the inner morality and historicity of eco-
nomic models, see for example Eymard-Duvernay and Thévenot (1986) and Favereau (1989). 
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be at the center of philosophical as well as analytical debates about how states 
function in the economy. (Storper and Salais 1997, 209) 
In their work, Storper and Salais distinguish three types of state conventions: 
the absent state convention, the external state convention, and the situated state 
convention. The absent state convention, as Storper and Salais put it (1997, 
211), opposes the state to the market. State interventions are rejected, since 
they are believed to “block […] actors from realizing their individual potential” 
(Storper and Salais 1997, 211). The external state defines the common good 
from the outside. For Storper and Salais this is exemplified by “postwar 
economic planning […] rooted in a widespread expectation that the State will 
insert itself from outside and above society to supply elements of coordination” 
(Storper and Salais 1997, 210). The external state is based upon “the notion of 
a rationalizing and organizing State-from-above” driven by “engineers who 
manage the State’s technical agencies and administrations” (Storper and Salais 
1997, 211). The situated state guarantees procedures for collective negotiation 
processes and the collective identification for solutions.3  
This notion of the convention of the state provides a perspective on economic 
activities grounded in deeper historical and state guaranteed configurations. 
Alain Desrosières systematically introduces statistics into this picture (Diaz-
Bone 2016, 62). In so doing, he shows that different state types have their own 
ways of statistically organizing and guaranteeing markets. He claims that  
[t]he history of economics has been punctuated since the eighteenth century 
by controversies about the relation between State and market; doctrines and 
policies, closely or less closely interrelated, succeeded each other […]. The 
historiography of economic thought, specifically the works which deal with 
the reciprocal interactions between the State and the science of economics, 
pays little notice to the differences between modes of statistical description 
specific to the various forms that the relations between the State and the 
market have taken throughout history. In short, the history of economic 
policies and that of statistics are rarely presented, let alone analyzed, jointly. 
(Desrosières 2011, 43) 
Thus, he develops a typology that enrolls the connectedness of state types with 
economic statistical tools. In his view, it is important to “‘re-endogenize’ the 
discourse of rationalization along the lines opened up by the modern-day 
sociology of science” (Desrosières 2011, 42) and to “[bring] to light its 
diversity, its contradictions, controversies, and points of fracture” (Desrosières 
2011, 43). This is important as he points out, since “the history of the tools of 
rationalization, despite what the rationalizers sometimes claim, is as turbulent 
                                                             
3  Storper and Salais refer to the German principle of subsidiarity allowing codetermination 
(Mitbestimmung) and the autonomy of wage bargaining (Tarifautonomie) to illustrate this 
state type. Other than the absent state and the external state, the situated state convention 
takes the plurality of the common good as a given, and does not suppress disputes in the 
name of market individualism or state planning. 
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and nonlinear as the history of the ways of viewing society” (Desrosières 2011, 
43). To bring about the plurality and the historicity of statistics, he 
distinguishes different state-statistical systems (Desrosières 2011, 45): 
- The engineer state uses statistics as a means to understand the necessity of 
production quantities based on input-output tables. It is a planning state 
with a long-term vision about demography, which determines the 
production in physical quantities based on technocratic reduction of cost 
planning, and optimization.  
- The liberal state uses statistics to ensure free competition and market 
transparency in order to install a free-trade policy. Its statistics concern 
trade-levels and prices and the measurement of possible dominant market 
positions and market shares.  
- The welfare state is based upon the assumption that the labor market is a 
specific market, which requires protection. Its statistics are about wage, 
employment, unemployment levels, and sampling surveys of workers’ 
household budgets, based for example on consumer price indexes.  
- The Keynesian state uses statistics in order to identify the global demand 
and to combat the cyclical crisis of the market. It supervises and manages 
the gap between global supply and demand through monetary and budgetary 
policies. It relies upon national accounting and economic budgets.  
- The neoliberal state moves from rights to incentives and it turns its 
administrations into agencies, and distributes the decision-making centers 
into polycentric networks connected via contractualization. Its statistic 
“relies on microeconomic dynamics [...] accepting the main hypotheses 
of the rational expectations theory” (ibid., 46).  
What Desrosières’s work adds to the analytical concept of the conventions of 
the state is the identification of the plurality of rationalizing and quantifying 
tools that lay at the heart of political economies and modern state formations.  
The perspective of the conventions of the state is a fruitful concept for the 
analysis of sustainable markets. It allows to see that the aforementioned welfare 
economic icons are located within the realm of the absent state convention 
outlined by Storper and Salais and within the neoliberal state convention 
outlined by Desrosières. They are built upon the state-versus-market distinction 
and in order to guarantee this divide, they apply microeconomic methodologies 
and statistical tools of commensuration and commodification. The statistical 
mechanism of commensuration – “the transformation of different qualities into 
a common metric” (Espeland and Stevens 1998, 314) – and the commodi-
fication process attached to it, are created to keep up the state-versus-market 
divide against socialist and interventionist solutions for environmental and 
social problems. But it is important to note that the sustainable markets 
analyzed in this article entail elements from other historical state forms, too. 
This article shows that we can identify different ‘neoliberal’ modes of 
microeconomic commensuration, from the welfare tax, over the cap-and-trade 
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mechanism, pay-for-success schemes, to nudging. All of them feature the 
notion of the absent state guaranteed via diverse microeconomic political 
programs. But they take on alliances with other and older state forms of the 
times of their historical emergence, like the interventionist or Keynesian tax 
state, the ordo-liberal market guaranteeing state, the entrepreneurial New 
Public Management state. In order to understand the appearance of 
microeconomic developments, it is important to understand the multiple state 
forms they are nurturing and nurtured by. The psychological state identified by 
Jessica Pykett and her coworkers, for example, offers an adequate description 
of the state form nurturing nudging as an adequate welfare policy tool (Jones, 
Pykett and Whitehead 2013; Pykett, Jones and Whitehead 2016). Thus, this 
article highlights the wide range of conventional forms we can find within the 
rather broad categories of the “absent state” outlined by Storper and Salais 
(focusing on the aspect of the state-versus-market divide) and the “neoliberal 
state” outlined by Desrosières (focusing on the aspect of microeconomic 
commensuration and incentive structures). 
Such a state-centered perspective is important to elucidate the often 
overlooked power relations established via sustainable markets and their 
seemingly neutral quantitative instruments. The analytical perspective of state 
conventions combined with a perspective elucidating the inner logic of the 
tools of quantification guaranteeing the microeconomic methodology allows to 
see the plurality of sustainable markets. The way just prices come to be 
guaranteed by the state can vary tremendously, so does the very figure of the 
free agent and/or the very figure of ‘the state.’ They appear to be encapsulated 
within the diverse technical commensuration processes. Commodification 
processes can be built upon these quite divers statistical and methodical 
“sovereign objects” (Davies 2014, 27), which define power relations and 
establish specific “financing circuits” (Chiapello 2018). They define who needs 
to be paid how much and why by whom, depending on the technical definition 
of ‘the free actor.’ The following chapter demonstrates this intertwinedness of 
questions of ‘the state’ with microeconomic methodologies. 
4. In Vivo-Sustainable State-Market Configurations 
The welfare economic attempts of Pigou, Coase, Dales, and Thaler are quite 
diverse. But they have a common adherence to the absent state convention and 
to economic methodological individualism. They put the concept of the free 
individual center stage, and they are united by the desire to prevent interven-
tionist, coercive, situational or collective solutions to the welfare problem. 
Even though they may be defined by these commonalities, they differ in im-
portant dimensions. They are linked to a specific historicity in the sense that 
their in-vivo forms, the moment the microeconomic blue-prints became suc-
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cessful political instruments, are linked to a specific state type featured by a 
specific historical world-political constellation. This means that economic 
instruments find their ways into politics in historical moments prepared for 
them. They are to be understood as state and microeconomic co-constructions 
and they ally with elements of other established state conventions: The welfare 
tax with the interventionist tax state, the cap-and-trade mechanism with ordo-
liberal multilateralism, the pay-for-success mechanism with a state that consid-
ers itself an entrepreneur engaging in bilateral contracts, and nudging with a 
paternalist state that invests into unconscious and pre-reflexive conditions for 
well-being, happiness, and health of its citizens. 
Table 1: Sustainable Markets and the State 
Sustainable mar-
ket mechanism Tax Cap-and-Trade Pay-for-Success Nudging 
Political / ideological context 
Historical  
situation 
New Deal,  
World War I + II 
End of Soviet Union, 
UN Earth Summit, 
transnational liberal 
world society
Austerity, New 
Public Manage-
ment, financial 
crisis
Post-liberal 
era, digitaliza-
tion 
Facilitating  
state 
Interventionist 
state, tax state, 
investing state 
Ordo-liberal state 
guaranteeing  
markets 
Entrepreneurial 
state engaging in 
‘public-private 
partnerships’
Psychological 
state, pater-
nalist state 
Corresponding 
welfare  
economics 
Pigou Dales Coase4 Thaler 
Sustainable market mechanism 
Techniques of 
commensuration 
/  commodifica-
tion 
Fixing of the price, 
free choice on the 
volume (produc-
tion levels) 
Fixing of the volume 
(cap), free price 
building mechanism 
(trade)
Volume and price 
(including statisti-
cal methods of 
control) defined in 
Volume 
(behavioural 
effects), no 
price (no 
Design of the 
free individual 
Polluters rationally 
adapt the volume 
of production to 
the cost 
Polluters trade 
emission rights, 
calculate CO2 
abatement costs
Entrepreneurs, 
rational and equal 
negotiators of 
bilateral contracts
Unconscious, 
irrational, and 
emotional 
Center  
of control 
State budget, 
budget law and 
politics 
Centralized transna-
tional ratification 
process of reduction 
targets, emission 
Intermediary, 
contract, evalua-
tor, jurisdiction in 
case of conflict
(Public or 
private) 
designer of 
the nudge, 
Monetary flows, 
financial circuit 
Businesses to state
(polluter pays) 
Selling and buying 
among emitters 
 
State to businesses
 
Non-
monetary 
(no coercion, 
no additional 
Source: Own Composition. 4 
                                                             
4  Ronald Coase being the microeconomic predecessor for pay-for-success schemes is less 
straightforward than the alignment of the other three welfare economists with their re-
spective sustainable markets. So, what makes Coase the microeconomic informant of this 
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Table 1 outlines this interconnectedness of state formations and sustainable 
markets. The diverse sustainable market mechanisms are explained by an ideo-
logical-political context containing of a historical world-political situation, a 
facilitating state formation, and a corresponding welfare economic paradigm 
that brakes through, and becomes identified as state of the art microeconomics 
of its time. The sustainable market mechanism (which is in the case of nudging 
not necessarily a ‘market’ anymore, even though it is designed as a market-
repair work), applies specific techniques of commensuration and commodifica-
tion, a specific design of the free individual, specific locus of control, and a 
specific monetary cycle or “financial circuit” (Chiapello 2018). 
4.1  Techniques of Commensuration / Commodification 
At the heart of any sustainable market mechanism are quite specific commensu-
ration and/or commodification methodologies. These technicalities are aligned 
with assumptions about the economic actor and his or her abilities to calculate or 
negotiate rationally and with assumptions about the abilities of the government.  
In-vivo configurations of the Pigovian welfare tax today often rely upon the 
concept of the “double-dividend” (Jorgenson et al. 2013), or make specified 
use of the income streams related to the tackled problem, in order to prevent a 
political misuse of the tax. An in-vivo example for the Pigovian sustainable 
market mechanism is the noise tax on airplanes at France’s nine biggest air-
ports. Here,  
[t]he amount of tax due per departure depends on the tax rate applicable at the 
departure airport (reaching from € 2.00 to € 35.00), the aircraft’s maximum 
take-off weight (MTOW), its certified noise performance (as specified in the 
aircraft’s noise certificate) and time of departure.5  
                                                                                                                                
state type? I want to highlight two Coasian elements featured by the entrepreneurial state. 
First, Coase’s claim was that negative externalities are a problem of bilateral negotiation. 
Thus, the private contract being the decisive locus for commensuration is clearly a Coasian 
line of thinking. Of course, Coase did not consider the state a business partner. He rather 
wanted to avoid the state as an interfering external instance to the welfare problem. But 
since the state later became entrepreneurial through New Public Management reforms, the 
Coasian heritage is ready to be applied to the state, too. Second, with transaction cost eco-
nomics, Coase argued for a strict empiricism in solving the question of efficiency. This trans-
lates into an impact-orientation and evaluation and measurement of market processes. 
Coase’s influence on competition policy and the impact-turn in this field may underline this 
argument (Marty 2015; Davies 2017). Still, this culture of evaluation does not translate into 
the measurement of transaction costs in most pay-for-success arrangements (see Gus-
tafsson-Wright et al. 2015, 35 for Social Impact Bonds). The strict claim for empiricism ra-
ther translates into impact measurements and calculations of impacts and effects that can 
be linked back to payment flows. I do not make a performativity argument, here. I rather 
want to argue that we see elements taken up, twisted, and re-used that can be traced back 
to Coase. 
5  See <http://www.fccaviation.com/regulation/france/noise-tax> (Accessed June 14, 2018). 
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The government uses the revenue to soundproof houses that are exposed to 
noise levels beyond 70 decibels. Another example is the carbon tax in British 
Columbia in Canada, which started in April 2018. The “carbon tax rate is $35 
per tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions. The tax rate will increase 
each year by $5 per tonne until it reaches $50 per tonne in 2021.” Since differ-
ent fuels generate different amounts of greenhouse gas emissions the tax rate is 
turned into specified price tags, e.g., for gasoline, diesel, and natural gas. The 
income streams are used to “increase the Low Income Climate Action tax cred-
it” and to provide tax relief for those “facilities that meet a performance 
benchmark based on the lowest emitting facility globally.”6 Here, the price tags 
are defined by state experts in order to steer free economic actors’ choices 
combined with interventionist and redistributive formats of governance. The 
calculative burden lies upon the state experts that have to define the “marginal 
external damage” and an economic sound reuse of the income streams aligned 
with the double-dividend hypothesis.  
The cap-and-trade mechanism, instead, is designed to avoid the price-
defining government. It creates a limited number of tradable emission rights 
(cap) to be distributed (allocated) among the market participants (polluters, 
emitters). It organizes free trade of emission rights among emitters and thus 
monetary flows between sellers and buyers of emission rights. Commensura-
tion is therefore designed as a cascade-like top-down process, which is best 
explained by the in-vivo market for greenhouse gas emissions in Europe estab-
lished by the EU Directive 2003/87/EC for greenhouse gas emission allowance 
trading. The European scheme is linked to an even bigger cap-and-trade mar-
ket, the Kyoto system. The Kyoto Protocol commits the State Parties to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions between 2008 and 2012, in relation to the base year 
1990 by 5.2 percent. This cap is identified via a multilateral process organized 
via the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
The European emissions trading scheme for industrial sites and energy compa-
nies (EU ETS) is linked to the Kyoto targets via a “burden sharing agreement,” 
which partitions the European Kyoto target of 8 percent between the Member 
States, e.g., Germany committing to taking 21 percent, and the UK committing 
to a 12.5 reduction target, and France to a +/- zero target of the Kyoto-target 
(Skjærseth and Wettestad 2008). These diverse national targets inform the 
National Allocation Plans controlled by the European Commission in the EU 
ETS (Ellerman et al. 2007). The allocation plans define the methods of alloca-
tion for a defined trading period, from Phase I (2005-2007), to Phase II (2008-
2012, the Kyoto Phase), to Phase III (2012-2020, the post-Kyoto phase), and 
Phase IV (2021-2030). The “accuracy, consistency and certainty” (Bowen and 
Wittneben 2011) of this top-down commensuration process is an issue of ongo-
                                                             
6  See <https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/environment/climate-change/planning-and-action/ 
carbon-tax> (Accessed June 14, 2018). 
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ing conflicts (Knoll 2014). This top-down process is continued at the national 
level, where diverse institutional trajectories and production regimes collide 
(Engels, Knoll, and Huth 2008). Till today the European trading scheme suffers 
from a significant over-allocation. Generally, in existing trading schemes scar-
city is difficult to be achieved (Carbon Market Watch 2015). Three allocation 
methods are applied in the EU ETS (Ellerman et al. 2007): grandfathering (free 
allocation based on historical emission levels), benchmarking (free allocation 
based on accomplished or not accomplished climate friendliness), and the 
auctioning of emission allowances by the state. Only in case of auctions the 
state generates income. Still, the main focus is the trading mechanism among 
polluters. 
The commodification process of the pay-for-success mechanism is crafted 
within bilateral contracts, not on an international or national level like the cap-
and-trade mechanism, or the tax. Pay-for-success schemes link the payments 
(price) with results, either in terms of measurable outputs (or impacts), or in 
terms of savings (which can be used to pay back the investor taking over the 
performance risk of an intervention). Other than classical public-private part-
nerships, pay-for-success is built upon a commodification mechanism, where 
the environmental/ social and the financial dimensions appear to be interlinked 
via a contracted impact-business model. The specific commensuration formula 
for the outcome evaluation of Social Impact Bonds (SIBs), a specific payment-
by-result model defined to identify public “cashable savings,” is defined like 
this:  
Number of outcomes avoided (improvement due to SIB) X unit cost per out-
come = potential savings to commissioners. (UK Government 2012, 19) 
The first Social Impact Bond in Peterborough developed an intervention to 
reduce the reoffending rates of ex-prisoners (Nicholls and Tomkinson 2015). 
This project provides social support to three defined cohorts of 1,000 prisoners 
of adult male offenders with less than 12 month imprisonment released from 
the prison. If the SIB reduced reoffending by a threshold of 10 per cent for any 
of the three cohort of the ex-prisoners, or 7.5 per cent across the entire group, 
the investors would receive a return of 2.5 per cent per annum (Nicholls and 
Tomkinson 2015, 347). The success of the program is identified by comparing 
the results of the intervention with the reoffending rates of a control-group 
released two years before. In the end, this pay-for-success contract delivered a 
return on investment of 3 per cent (Anders and Dorsett 2017). Another pro-
gram, the Reconnections SIB in the UK, tackles the issue of loneliness of elder-
lies who use health care institutions for reasons of loneliness, and it shares 
these cost savings with the investors. It calculates  
that chronic loneliness may cost commissioners £12,000 per person, of which 
approximately 40% occurs within five years (GP visits, A&E visits, hospital 
admissions, residential care, some costs associated with depression and diabe-
tes). (Social Finance Limited 2015, 10)  
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The program is set up to decrease the level of loneliness among a defined group 
of elderly people “by a period of personalized volunteer-led support to access 
community-based activities or informal networks” and “low-level cognitive 
behavioural therapy” where required (Social Finance Limited 2015, 15). The 
level of cashable savings is calculated on the basis of estimated costs of loneli-
ness for the public sector (Social Finance Limited 2015, 11). It is important to 
mention that the state is considered as a private business partner in these pay-
for-success models. Many of these schemes do not publish the core of their 
business models entailing the commensuration and commodification technicali-
ties since they are considered private (Gustafsson-Wright et al. 2015, 55-129). 
The pay-for-success model, in general, is open to quite an array of actor 
constellations and return-models. The commensuration process is defined as 
bottom-up, from contract to contract. Generally, the private contract structure 
allows a huge variety on the financial side and on the impact side:  
- The World Bank, for example, discusses financial vehicles that may enter 
the pay-for-success model. Its legal report states: “Future contracts 
should also utilize financial engineering technology and tools, including 
swaps, credit ratings, tranched debt, guarantees, and alternative bond is-
suances” (Fariello et al. 2016, 144). The pay-for-success model often in-
volves “blended finance” or what is called “creative financing” with quite 
diverse roles (debtors and creditors taking over quite diverse default risks 
and guarantees, etc.) for service providers, foundations, professional fi-
nancial investors, banks, and public authorities (Nicholls 2014).  
- On the impact side, the possibilities are as diverse as on the finance side. 
The UK National Audit Office (2015), states that a “[g]ood evaluation 
starts at the planning stage, with a clear statement of what commissioners 
are seeking to achieve and how value for money will be assessed” (Na-
tional Audit Office 2015, 33). Value for money commensuration tech-
niques are flexible. The assessed tools range from “control group with 
similar characteristics subject to alternative provision,” over a “control 
group with similar characteristics subject to no intervention,”7 a “mod-
elled counterfactual for alternative provision,“ an „estimate of non-
intervention rate […] (estimate of what would have been achieved with-
out intervention),” to weaker versions of a “baseline of performance at 
start of scheme” and “commissioners’ expectations of performance” (Na-
tional Audit Office 2015, 35).  
The monetary flows in pay-for-performance schemes are highly contract de-
pendent (see for example Tse and Warner 2018 for a comparison of three So-
cial Impact Bonds in the US). These contracts need to be attractive for pre-
                                                             
7  This method requires a defined group of potential service users to be excluded from the 
benefits of the social program, but still needs to be evaluated (Gustafsson-Wright et al. 
2015, 31).  
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financing private investors and therfore often overestimate the impact or over-
pay the investor (see for example Neyland 2017; Tse and Warner 2018). It is 
highly unlikely that the state saves money from these interventions in the long 
run.  
Nudging is not about commodification, but the welfare economic tools in-
volve processes of commensuration. Nudging is not about building markets, 
but about making people better market participants. Its technicalities aim at 
better understanding behavioral patterns of defined groups of people and the 
way their behavior can be influenced in a positive way. It is about causal ef-
fects of policy interventions, which are not necessarily conscious to those being 
affected or nudged. Statistical knowledge is created to understand well-being as 
a problem of behavioral evidence (Davies 2015). The technicalities of com-
mensuration thus produce knowledge about  
how lasting many of the effects are; how effects that work in one set of cir-
cumstances will work in another; and whether effects that work well with one 
segment of the population will work with another. (Halpern et al. 2010, 10)  
The UK Government, for example, established “The Behavioral Insights 
Team,” which produces knowledge on “Why do parents bring children with 
minor illness to emergency and urgent care departments,” “Improving transi-
tion out of the Armed Forces: Engaging families through behavioural insights,“ 
and “The impact of improved transparency of foreign money transfers for 
consumers and SMEs.”8 The tackled policy fields are wide-ranging. In method-
ological terms, nudging is rather pragmatic and individualized. It applies statis-
tical methods from other disciplines, like experimental neuroscience (Pykett 
2017) and defines them for each project or intervention. Each project needs to 
define “What exactly means ‘effective’?” and “Which level of scientific evi-
dence is ‘enough’?” (Reisch 2018). Digitalization and “big-data” can help to 
satisfy this hunger for data on behavioral patterns and it may be used to reach 
large groups of people. In Uganda, for example, the Text to Change initiative 
(financed and partnered by Celtel, Merck, the local NGO AIDS Information 
Centre, and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) uses mobile phone prompts 
in order to encourage people to make better health choices and receive regular 
medical check-ups and immunizations to fight the HIV transmission. An inter-
active quiz is designed and used to nudge people’s interests into the desired 
direction (Whitehead et al. 2014, 33).9  
The next section aims at linking the emergence of these diverse sustainable 
market mechanisms to the historical state formations of their time. This is not 
to say that these sustainable markets are outdated, but to say that these contem-
                                                             
8  See <https://www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk/publications> (Accessed August 10, 2018). 
9  See <also http://images.aarogya.com/aids/pdf/unandzain.pdf> (Accessed August 10, 2018). 
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porary forms have their specific moments of historical origin grounded in cer-
tain conventional state formations.  
4.2  Historical Situation and the Link to State Conventions 
As I said earlier, all the sustainable market mechanisms discussed in this article 
adhere to microeconomic methodology and are based upon the conceptions of 
the absent state, assuming a divide between the state and the market (or the free 
economic actor). But they do so in a very specific way, which can only be 
explained by the moments of historical origin, where they had to establish 
alliances with other pre-existing state conventional forms.  
When we think of the historical context of the Pigovian welfare tax, it is cer-
tainly not a coincidence that it was a successful sustainable market idea in 
times of an interventionist planning welfare state. Even though taxes devised to 
organize redistribution versus taxes devised to internalize externalities are very 
different from each other, the Pigovian tax requires a centralized administrative 
taxing infrastructure which makes it an obvious instrument to be implemented. 
Furthermore, the Pigovian tax draws on a culture of state expertise of a plan-
ning or interventionist state that understands itself as a competent actor able to 
gather the necessary statistical information to model marginal private utility 
and marginal cost levels, which then translate into the total marginal cost for 
the whole society. Pigou himself acknowledged the difficulties of an all-
knowing state, but he did not see an alternative to it.  
Different from that, the cap-and-trade mechanism is based upon a transna-
tional ordo-liberal administrative infrastructure of a world society transcending 
the nation state (Engels 2006). Even so, there have been national “forerunner” 
emission trading schemes in the US (Levin and Espeland 2002), in the UK 
(Nye and Owens 2008), and in the Netherlands (Pedersen 2000). It is not by 
coincidence that the cap-and-trade-mechanism was promoted as a global solu-
tion for a global climate change (Svendsen 1999). The rationale behind an 
international trade of reduction quotas is appealing from the perspective of a 
nation-state transcending world society. The following calculation demon-
strates that: 
Comparisons between Denmark and Poland have shown that it is four times 
cheaper to reduce CO2 emissions in Poland than it is in Denmark […]. Trad-
ing CO2 quotas causes CO2 reduction to take place in the countries where it is 
cheapest. It makes no difference whether the reduction is made in Russia, Po-
land or any other country. CO2 is a global pollutant, that is, the emission of 
CO2 causes the same global greenhouse effect regardless of the geographical 
location of the source. (Svendsen 1999, 234) 
To apply the notion of ordo-liberalism, the work of Frédéric Marty (2015) is of 
help. He uses the framework of the conventions of the state to understand the 
plural stances of European competition policy. Here, too, we do see diverse 
state instantiations of just markets. In the ordo-liberal convention of competi-
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tion policy, free markets need to be instituted by an external state, in the sense 
that states are expected to cure markets from monopolies and help establishing 
equal market entrances (Marty 2015, 98). In the cap-and-trade mechanism, we, 
too, see a state that is external to the market, instantiating the market via new 
entrance reserves and allocation policies. The cap-and-trade mechanism re-
quires strong states external to the market, implementing and guaranteeing free 
markets from above. After the fall of the iron curtain, the liberal West was 
powerful and self-confident enough to organize something as complicated and 
demanding as the international Kyoto process – the Climate Conferences of the 
Parties (COP) – with its ongoing negotiation for binding reduction targets after 
Kyoto.10 
The pay-for-success mechanism requires states that consider themselves 
“entrepreneurs” or even “investors.” It builds upon administrative elements of 
the Public Private Partnership and upon New Public Management reforms. 
These reforms help to frame public investments as performance and outcome 
risks sellable to private parties. This opens up the pay-for-success-model to 
“impact investing” (Barman 2015), fostering the idea of the financial market 
“filling the capital gap” (Nicholls 2014). Social Impact Investing was promoted 
at the global political agenda after the financial crisis in 2008 as a solution to 
welfare and environmental problems in times of severe public budgetary con-
straints.11 In Davos in 2013, the so-called Social Impact Investment Taskforce 
was formed, which seeks to insert entrepreneurial methods of accounting into 
the realm of environmental and welfare projects in order to render them invest-
able (Social Impact Investment Taskforce 2014). The World Economic Forum, 
                                                             
10  The international climate change negotiation process – the UN Conferences of the Parties 
(COP) – suffers from the difficulty to set up a binding Kyoto follow-up agreement. The Paris 
Agreement in 2016 (COP 21) is based on a control mechanism that is not yet defined, so 
called Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs). They work with defined tar-
gets and the measurement of their success. The national targets in sum are still linked to an 
overall cap, the 2 degree scenario (and the 1.5 degree scenario). It is an open question to 
what kind of a sustainable market mechanism this will lead. It is possible that climate 
friendly investments and pay-for-success schemes become much more important than the 
cap-and-trade mechanism. It is also possible that the European Union will intensify emis-
sions trading, which is potentially open to the inclusion of many more industries, like avia-
tion, shipping, or transport and can be linked to other regional trading schemes in the 
world, even without having agreed on a Kyoto target (Carbon Market Watch 2015). Another 
option is taxation. Sweden, for example, participates in the European emissions trading 
scheme and turned back to the seemingly old-fashioned carbon tax (Carbon Market Watch 
2015).  
11  In an interesting discursive twist, the financial crisis has turned to become a crisis of public 
budget discipline (see for example Morales et al. 2014). Explaining this turn is beyond the 
argument of this article, but it is an important entry point for impact investing, which ar-
gues to bring in fresh capital and entrepreneurial discipline into the realm of welfare and 
environmental politics.  
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“the international organization for public-private cooperation,”12 is very differ-
ent from the international platform established by the UN Kyoto process. Pay-
for-success is a mechanism not exclusively guaranteed by states. It may also be 
applied in multi-stakeholder set-ups between foundations, NGOs, corporations, 
social and environmental entrepreneurs, and other public-private financing 
agencies like the European Social Impact Accelerator Fund, partly financed by 
European Investment Fund and partly by private banks.13 It does not require an 
external and intervening state, but government units that consider themselves as 
entrepreneurs and/or investors managing public investments as sellable perfor-
mance risks, featuring risk and return models in the realm of public policy 
(Chiapello 2015). The locus of control in most pay-for-performance schemes is 
an intermediary organization (Bessy and Vatin 2013), which helps to develop 
the terms and conditions of the contract structure, sets up the Special Purpose 
Vehicle (SPV), coordinates the evaluation and the payment modalities, medi-
ates in situations of conflict, etc. The state is a business partner, not an external 
center of control, and by far not all-knowing.  
Like pay-for-success, nudging is not only applied by states. It may also be 
applied by corporations in relation to their employees, by NGOs, or by founda-
tions and charities. Still, Whitehead and his colleagues identify 51 independent 
states “with centrally orchestrated nudge-type policy initiatives” (Whitehead et 
al. 2014, 24), among them the UK, the US, Canada, Australia, France, Japan, 
and China. Nudging is not only interesting for Western liberal democracies, but 
also for “new authoritarians” (Guriev and Treisman 2015). Both seek to govern 
and influence the behavior of the masses or defined groups of people, be it for 
the purpose of rationalizing non-rational choices or for the purpose of de-
politicizing public discourses without violence. King et al. (2017), for example, 
found that the social media networks in China are used to influence the politi-
cal discussions by turning the debate towards more apolitical topics like the 
weather and sports. It is interesting to see that Sunstein (2016) dedicated a book 
to the immoralities of nudging, where he discusses the conditions of a good 
nudge contrasting it to immoral interventions. The distinction is not so easy. 
Some say a nudges need to “be fully transparent – Subject to public scrutiny 
and review” (Reisch 2018) to be aligned with Western democratic values. 
Nonetheless, we might conclude that nudging is nurtured by a state type that is 
much more paternalist, interventionist, and all-knowing than its welfare eco-
nomic predecessors have wished for. It produces an insatiable thirst for statisti-
cal data on behavioral patterns, causal effects of interventions, and therefore 
digitalization seems to be its natural ally. Furthermore, nudging can be linked 
to the aforementioned pay-for-success model, which demands provable out-
                                                             
12  See <https://www.weforum.org/about/world-economic-forum> (Accessed October 14, 2018). 
13  See <http://www.eif.europa.eu/what_we_do/equity/sia/index.htm> (Accessed October 14, 
2018). 
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comes to define cashable savings or conditioned payment schemes. Nudging 
also sometimes allies with classical welfare programs like the mentioned pen-
sion scheme opt-out solutions (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, 111).  
What we have seen so far is that these sustainable markets all define a cer-
tain state-versus-market distinction, which informs questions of control and 
monetary flows. The technical procedures of commensuration cannot be ana-
lyzed as neutral tools, but they decide about who becomes evaluated by whom, 
who owes money to whom, which kind of state administration is required, etc. 
Questions of power and finance are deeply enshrined into the devices of com-
mensuration and commodification. What we have also seen is that welfare 
economic attempts have their specific moment of emergence, which makes the 
notion of the conventions of the state an interesting analytical tool, since it does 
not only bring about the performativity (Callon 1998) of economic theory (here 
welfare economics), but also the historical preparedness for economic theories, 
or specific aspects thereof.  
5.  Conclusion 
Welfare economics has been presented as a diverse program with a common 
aim: solving welfare and environmental problems by private and individual 
means. For over a century, welfare economics addressed a complicated prob-
lem: how to create welfare without adhering to public deliberation, collectiv-
ism, socialism, or direct state interventions, like command-and-control. Wel-
fare economics found quite diverse answers to this problem. Their disputes 
have been outlined in this paper showing that welfare economic attempts craft 
the state-versus-market distinction quite differently, and apply quite different 
methods of commensuration, in accordance with the notion of the individual or 
the agent they apply. From the welfare tax, over the cap-and-trade mechanism, 
to pay for success-schemes, like Social Impact Bonds, and nudging programs, 
all these sustainable market mechanisms guarantee (or aim at guaranteeing) the 
paradox of the absent state in one way or the other. Sustainable markets are 
built from a two-sided maneuver: asking states to implement and guarantee the 
market, and acting as if markets were free from states. This paradox is resolved 
by the profession of welfare economics in one way or the other, and it has been 
resolved in quite diverse terms during the liberal era. By comparing four sus-
tainable market mechanisms (the Pigovian tax, cap-and-trade, pay-for-success, 
and nudging), this article brings to the fore the plurality of microeconomic 
commensuration and commodification procedures, which establish diverse loci 
of control, diverse state-versus-market differences, and diverse monetary flows 
(e.g., either from states to markets, or from markets to states). The analytical 
framework of convention theory is stating the interconnectedness of economic 
technicality, morality, and politics (Desrosières, Chiapello). It therefore has 
HSR 44 (2019) 1  │  252 
been a helpful analytical framework for the analysis of sustainable markets. In 
this article, sustainable markets have not been analyzed from the perspective of 
ex-post evaluative plurality and flexibility (that is often connected with “On 
Justification” of Boltanski and Thévenot), but from the perspective of conven-
tions of state formations (Salais and Storper) and state statistics (Desrosières). 
The typology developed in this article is meant to inform the analysis of con-
temporary sustainable markets and to render visible their specific historicity, 
which cannot be separated from state formations. At the core of any sustainable 
market is the statistical program, established to guarantee and prove the justice 
of the market, or the rationality of single and free economic agents, which 
have, in this article, only been contoured. In order to understand the diversity of 
sustainable markets it is important to bring these diverse public-private com-
mensuration and commodification formats to the fore. Convention theory with 
its notion of the convention of the state is a useful perspective to reveal those 
differences, because it is a theory that was from its beginning meant to over-
come the state-versus-market divide still vivid in many economic and social 
analyses of sustainable markets. By picturing sustainable markets from the 
perspective of the state, they come to be analyzed as collective arrangements 
transforming the governing forms of the state, its agents, hierarchies, its mone-
tary flows, and its control and monitoring techniques. Convention theory, fur-
thermore, has a tradition of historical analysis, which helps seeing the parallels 
of quite diverse mechanisms, from taxation, over carbon markets to impact 
investing. The article showed that markets and states have no essence, but are 
formed and transformed in historical disputes over the common good. During 
this process of critique and justification (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006) within 
welfare economics itself the very notion of the state and that of the market, 
both, change fundamentally. They may further change in a way that states are 
not any more recognizable as typical external and regulating governments, and 
free economic actors are not considered to be rational any more. We will see. 
What is important is to analyze procedural technicality, financial relations, and 
power relations conjointly.  
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